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Abstract
We introduce the notion of digital-arbitration which enables resolving disputes
between servers and users with the aid of arbitrators. Arbitrators are semi-trusted
entities in the social network that facilitate communication or business transactions.
The communicating parties, users and servers, agree before a communication
transaction on a set of arbitrators they trust (reputation systems may support their
choice). Then, the arbitrators receive a resource, e.g., a deposit, and a terms-of-use
agreement between participants such that the resource of a participant is returned if
and only if the participant acts according to the agreement.
We demonstrate the usage of arbitrators in the scope of conditional anonymity.
A user interacts anonymously with a server as long as the terms for anonymous
communication are honored. If a server identifies a violation of the terms, it proves to
the arbitrators that a violation took place and the arbitrators publish the identity of the
user.
Keywords: Digital arbitration, Trusted communication, Conditional anonymity
Introduction
The number of transactions carried out on the Internet has grown exponentially. The
scalability of the Internet is based on the distribution of tasks among participants. Specif-
ically, peer to peer, machine to machine, and clients and servers execute independent
transactions with no central controlling entity. A Certificate Authority (CA) is a promi-
nent example of the opposite approach; a centralized entity is heavily used as part
of the public key infrastructure or as part of the communication protocol to secure
transactions/communication on the Internet.
We suggest using additional semi-trusted entities to relieve the load of tasks handled
by a CA. These entities are called arbitrators. An arbitrator can be a semi-trusted peer
in a social network or an agency (implemented by servers in the system) who gains a
reputation for being trusted in the distributed reputation system.
The social network’s penetration into everyday life increases the opportunities for col-
laboration among peers who trust each other to a certain degree according to their past
reputation. One existing social infrastructure and judgment process is the court of law
and the process of arbitration by jury. We exploit the opportunities that the current digi-
tal cyber social network technology enables, namely, defining, designing, and facilitating
digital arbitration by digital arbitrators.
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Arbitrators
In the real world, arbitrators are used to resolve disputes between two parties outside the
court of law. The disputing parties turn to a third, generally contained, party to resolve
their dispute. The resolution of the arbitration process is binding for both parties.
We suggest using arbitrators in the digital world that resemble arbitrators in the real
world, e.g., P2P, semi-trusted entities that function as a jury in the technological court
of law. However, naturally there are differences between the two. For example, in our
framework, there would be more than one arbitrator, the sanctions that take place in case
of a violation are set in advance, and only a collaboration of enough arbitrators is allowed
to carry out the sanction.
Introduction to digital arbitration
Interaction between a user and a server in the digital arbitration setting occurs as follows.
In the beginning of the initial phase of communication between two parties, a user and
a server (or user and user in a symmetric scenario) agree on a contract. The contract
contains three parts; a Terms of Use agreement (ToU) that defines what is legitimate,
namely, what the user is allowed to do during the communication, a set of arbitrators, and
a resource which the server receives in case the user violates the agreement. If the user
violates the agreement, then the server appeals to the arbitrators and if a large enough
set of arbitrators agree that the user actually violated the agreement, they will provide the
server with the information that is needed to reconstruct the resource.
The ToU is an agreed upon algorithm which outputs whether or not an interaction is
legal. On the other hand, a ToU can be much less strict, allowing operators of arbitrators
to use their own (partially trusted) common sense. In Section “Digital arbitration” we
provide a strict definition of the ToU and the arbitration process.
This scheme requires a trusted party, such as a Certificate Authority (CA) in the initial
stage. The CA must vouch for the users’ digital resource, otherwise the server cannot be
sure that the guaranteed resource is indeed distributed to the arbitrators. In addition, the
CA must sign the user’s public key so that the server can verify messages from the user
and prove to the arbitrators that the user is actually in violation of an agreement.
Conditional anonymity
We demonstrate the need for arbitrators in the scope of anonymous transactions.
Anonymity is an important feature for users who want to preserve their privacy on the
Internet in general and on communication networks, specifically. Anonymity, however,
can be abused to perform illegal actions without fear of reprisal or of legal proceedings.
Thus, designing systems that support conditional anonymity is of great importance.
Related work
Some concepts that appear in the literature and which are related to our ideas are
revocable privacy, key and identity escrow systems, digital money, and blacklisting.
Hoepman [1] defines revocable privacy as designing systems in such a way that no per-
sonal information is available unless a user violates the pre-established terms of service.
In contrast to our work, the user’s personal details (and when and how he violated the
terms) are revealed to certain authorized parties. Stadler [2] proposed a new type of blind
signature schemes which he called fair blind signature schemes. These schemes have the
Brownstein et al. Journal of Trust Management  (2016) 3:3 Page 3 of 12
additional property that, with the help of trusted authority, the signer can efficiently iden-
tify the sender of a signed message. This primitive is used in later works, such as [3], to
achieve revocable anonymity.
In contrast to our system, there are schemes where the revocation mechanism of revo-
cable privacy is initiated by a trusted entity such as law enforcement agency [4] or judges
[5]. The arbitrators in our model, on the other hand, are peers in a social network that
need not be fully trusted.
The ideas behind key escrow [6] and identity escrow [7] systems are similar to ours.
The main difference is that in these systems, the power to decide whether the user’s key
or identity can be revoked is held by the same central authority (escrow agent(s)) that
provides the credentials in the first stage. In our system, on the other hand, the decision is
made by the arbitrators and the central authority only provides the initial credentials and
then has no further participation in the system.
Franklin and Reiter [8] propose a similar idea to ours. They propose using a single semi-
trusted entity in a fair exchange environment. The differences between their work and
ours are that in their work, they use only one entity; the third party is assumed not to
collude with either of the other parties. Furthermore, andmost importantly, they describe
a fair exchange in which if both parties (client and server) are honest, then both can learn
each other’s documents. In our setting, on the other hand, the server will not learn the
client’s secret information.
Another group of solutions are k times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) systems
[9]. As implied by their name, these systems provide anonymous authentication k times.
Until the kth time, not one single party (not even the trusted party) can identify the user,
whereas in the k + 1 attempt, the anonymity of the user is revoked. The trusted party
is involved in the registration stage only, hence the server can revoke user anonymity
by itself. Camenisch et al. [10] extend k-TAA to allow k anonymous authentications in a
single time period, i.e., after a predefined period of time, the counter is set to zero and k
is recounted.
Nymble [11] takes a different approach. In this and such works, the anonymity of a
misbehaving user is not revoked. Instead, these systems use blacklists in order to prevent
the user from receiving a service. BLACR [12] extends these works by adding reputation
scores to anonymous users.
Digital arbitration
In this section we illustrate the basic scenario of digital arbitration. For ease of readability,
we consider the user – server scenario. In the following sections we provide two exam-
ples for the digital arbitration that use the primitives described here. The first example
is conditional anonymity in the user – server model. The second example is a business
transaction in the user – user model.
The digital arbitration environment is comprised of four entities; User U, server S,
certificate authority CA, and a set of arbitrators AR. Figure 1 presents the entities and
the connections between them. The server provides a service to the user. The CA ver-
ifies the means which are needed for the arbitration process (e.g., validates the digital
goods) and the arbitrators decide whether or not to give the digital goods to the server.
All messages in the scheme are sent on communication channels and these channels are
considered reliable. Since the CA must vouch for the users’ digital resource and sign the
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Fig. 1 Participants: U-user, S-server, CA, and a set of arbitrators
user’s public key so that the server can verify messages from the user and prove to the
arbitrators that the user is actually in violation of an agreement, the channel between the
user and the CA is authenticated.
The goal of the server is to provide a service. If a user who receives this service violates
the agreement, then the server obtains the digital goods with the aid of the arbitrators.
We call this property server security. As long the user does not violate the agreement, the
digital goods remain hidden from the server.We later define this property as user security.
Each party (user or server) might occasionally be dishonest in its dealings with the other
party. That is, the user may try to hide the digital goods even if it violates the agreement
and the server may try to acquire the digital goods even if the user does not violate the
agreement. Moreover, we assume that up to t arbitrators can be malicious and cooperate
with either a dishonest user or a dishonest server (note that we consider an arbitrator that
is under a man in the middle attack to be dishonest since its share may leak). In order
to guarantee user and server security, there must be at least n, n ≥ 2t + 1 arbitrators
in the scheme. These settings of arbitrators assure that we have at least t + 1 arbitrators
cooperating with the server in case of user violation but no more than t in case of server
violation.
Definitions
We define an efficiently computable function f : (ToU ,M) → (0, 1). The function f
receives a Terms of Use agreement ToU and a set of messages M and outputs 0, if the
messages do not violate the ToU and 1, if the messages do violate the ToU.
Definition 1. Honest arbitrator –An honest arbitrator i is an arbitrator that given a set
of messagesM and a Terms of Use agreement ToU, outputs its share, shi, if f (ToU ,M) = 1
and otherwise outputs ⊥.
Definition 2. User security – Let all arbitrators receive ToU. A digital arbitration
scheme ensures user security if for any set of messages M signed by the user such that
f (ToU ,M) = 0 and there are at most t dishonest arbitrators, then the server does not
receive any information on the digital goods DG.
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Definition 3. Server security – Let all arbitrators receive ToU. A digital arbitration
scheme ensures server security if for any set of messages M signed by the user such that
f (ToU ,M) = 1 and there are at least t + 1 honest arbitrators, then the server receives the
digital goods DG.
Digital arbitration scheme
The system has three phases; initialization, communication, and arbitration.
A. Initialization
The user and the server participate in the first two steps of the initialization phase.
Step 1 – the user sends the server a message that contains an identifier for the user,
IDU , and a set of preferred arbitrators, ar, where ar = {Ar1,Ar2, . . . ,Arm}. The number
of the arbitrators in the set is large enough to allow the server to select enough arbitrators
in Step 2.
Step 2 – the server sends a message to U. The message contains a Terms of Use
agreement ToU and a set, AR. The set AR = {Ar1,Ar2, . . . ,Arn} contains n arbitrators
(n ≥ 2t + 1, where t is a system parameter and the threshold of the secret sharing algo-
rithm) from ar, the actual arbitrators used in the arbitration phase. Note that we have
simplified the negotiation process between the user and the server on the arbitrators and
a more sophisticated algorithmmay apply. Among other components, the ToU contains n
- the number of arbitrators, the threshold t, the type of the digital goods, etc. If the server
and user cannot agree on system parameters (e.g., n, t, list of arbitrators, and ToU), the
algorithm halts. When receiving the ToU, the user checks it and if the user does not agree
to the ToU, then the user sends an error message to the server and the algorithm halts.
In Steps 1 and 2, the user and the server agree on the AR and on the ToU. Note that the
server and the user may use a reputation system to support their choice of arbitrators.
The next three steps (3-5 in Fig. 2) are carried out between the user and the CA and
between the user and the server.
Step 3 – let p, q be prime numbers, q|p − 1 (i.e., q is an integral divisor of p) and
let g be a generator of a subgroup of size q in Z∗p. The user U with digital goods DG
constructs a random polynomialA (with random coefficients) of degree t,A = DG+a1x+
a2x2 + . . . + atxt mod q, where the ai are random and the free coefficient is the digital
goods. The user also constructs a pair of signature (SKU ) and verification (VKU ) keys
Fig. 2 Initialization 2: Step 3 – the user sends the polynomial A, the user identifier IDU , the verification key
VKU , and the ToU to the CA. Step 4 – the CA sends the commitment C, the signature on the verification key
(SigCA(VKU)), and the signature on the ToU (SigCA(ToU)) to the user. Step 5 – the user forwards the message
received in Step 4 to the server
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according to some digital signature scheme. Each message in the communication phase is
signed by the user using the signature key and verified by the server using the verification
key.U sends amessage to the CAwhich contains the polynomialA, the generator g (which
is later explained), the user identifier IDU , the verification key VKU , and the ToU.
Step 4 – upon receiving the messages in Step 3, the CA performs the following checks.
The CA checks that polynomial A is of degree t (defined in the ToU) and that the value
A(0) is a valid DG (which means that the DG follows the definition in the ToU). If at
least one of the tests fails, the CA sends an error message to the user and the algo-
rithm halts. Otherwise, the CA signs the user’s verification key (SigCA(VKU)) and the ToU
(SigCA(ToU)) and then builds a commitment C for the polynomial A according to Feld-
man’s VSS algorithm [13] C = {g, c0 = gDG, c1 = ga1 , . . . , ct = gat mod p}. The CA then
sends the commitment C along with its signatures on each ci ∈ C for i = 0, . . . , t to the
user. We denote the set of all such signatures as SigCA(C).
Step 5 – the user forwards the message received from the CA in Step 4 to the server.
The message contains the commitment C, the CA’s signatures on the user verification key,
and the CA’s signatures on the ToU. The server verifies all the signatures and the ToU. If
the server can not verify the signatures, then the server sends an error message and the
algorithm halts. Note that the commitment C will be used by the server only in case of a
violation of the ToU in order to check the authenticity of the shares which will be received
from the arbitrators.
The last four steps in the initialization phase (Steps 6-9 in Fig. 3) are performed between
the user and each arbitrator and the server and each arbitrator.
Step 6 – according to Shamir secret sharing [14], user U constructs n shares {sh1 =
A(1), sh2 = A(2), . . . , shn = A(n)} from the polynomial A. Note that n is a system param-
eter set in the ToU and n ≥ 2t + 1 (where t is the degree of the polynomial). The user
sends n messages, one message to each arbitrator Ari (1 ≤ i ≤ n) from the set AR. The
message contains the identifier of the user IDU , the ToU, the commitment C, the user
verification key VKU , and the ith share shi.
Step 7 – the server sends n messages, one message to each arbitrator Ari (1 ≤ i ≤
n) from the set AR. Each message contains the identifier of the user IDU , the ToU, the
commitment C, the user verification key VKU , and the share’s index i.
Fig. 3 Initialization 3: Step 6 – to each arbitrator Ari the user sends its identifier IDU , the ToU, the commitment
C, the verification key VKU , and the share shi . Step 7 – to each arbitrator Ari the server sends its identifier IDU ,
the ToU, the commitment C, the verification key VKU , and the index i. Step 8 – each arbitrator sends OK to the
user. Step 9 – each arbitrator sends OK to the server
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Upon receiving the messages in Steps 6 and 7, each arbitratorAri performs several tests.
The arbitrator checks that the ToU, IDU , C, and VKU received from the server are identi-
cal to those received from the user. In addition, according to Feldman’s VSS algorithm, the
arbitrator uses the commitment C in order to validate the share it received by verifying
that the following equality holds:
gshi ≡ c0 · ci1 · ci
2













j=0 ajij mod q) mod p
If all tests succeed, the arbitrator continues to Steps 8 and 9 (see Fig. 3). Otherwise (if at
least one of the tests fails), the arbitrator sends error messages to the user and the server
and the algorithm halts.
Step 8 – the arbitrator sends an OK message to the user. If the user receives an OK
message from all n arbitrators, the user continues to the communication phase, otherwise,
the algorithm halts.
Step 9 – the arbitrator sends an OK message to the server. If the server receives an
OK message from all n arbitrators, the server continues to the communication phase,
otherwise, the algorithm halts.
B. Communication
In this phase the user and the server communicate according to the ToU. Each mes-
sage the user sends to the server is signed by the user signature key SKU and verified
by the server using the verification key VKU . The server accepts signed messages
only.
If the server suspects that one or more messages sent from the user violate the ToU, the
server continues on the arbitration phase.
C. Arbitration
Let M = {m1, . . . ,mv} be a set of v messages that the user sent to the server which the
server believes violate the ToU and let SigU(M) = {SigU(m1), . . . , SigU(mv)} be the set of
the user’s signatures on these messages. The server initiates an arbitration phase in Step 1.
Step 1 – to each arbitrator Ari, the server sends the identifier of the user IDU , the
messagesM, and the signatures SigU(M).
Step 2 – each arbitrator Ari verifies the signatures of the user on the messages and
uses f to decide whether or not the messages violate the ToU. An honest arbitrator who
decides that the messages do violate the ToU sends the share shi to the server. An honest
arbitrator who decides that the messages do not violate the ToU does not send the share
shi to the server.
The server uses C according to Feldman’s VSS algorithm to verify that any received
share, shi, is a correct share in the secret sharing scheme. This is performed in the same
way as the arbitrators do in Step 7 of the initialization phase. If the share is not correct,
then the server discards it. If enough (at least t + 1) shares are received and verified,
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the server can reconstruct the digital goods by using the inverse of the secret sharing
algorithm.
Security analysis
Here we provide a proof sketch for the security of the system. Note that we assume that
the CA is trustworthy. Other than the fact that the CA is trustworthy, the adversary can
control each participant (the user, the server, and any subset of the arbitrators). Let us
define the following:
Definition 4. Good polynomial – Let F be a field, let t ∈ N and let DG ∈ F. We say
that a polynomial A(x) ∈ F[x] is (t,DG) − good if A(x) is of degree t and A(0) = DG.
Notation 1. If t and DG are clear from the context then we say that a (t,DG) − good
polynomial is simply a good polynomial.
Definition 5. Good share – Let i ∈ N, let shi ∈ F and let A(x) be a good polynomial.
We say that an ordered pair (i, shi) is a good share iff A(i) = shi.
Definition 6. Good commitment – Let C be a Feldman’s VSS commitment to a good
polynomial A(X) ∈ F[x], let i ∈ N and shi ∈ F. We say that C is a good commitment if
there is an efficient algorithm that given C, i and shi can verify whether (i, shi) is a good
share of A(x) or not.
Theorem 1. Assume that Feldman’s VSS algorithm is secure and that the digital sig-
natures are unforgeable. At the end of the initialization phase, described in Section
“Digital arbitration”, if either the server or the user is honest, then they both continue the
scheme only if the following two conditions are met:
1. The server and the user agree on the ToU and on the set of arbitrators AR. In
addition, every honest arbitrator receives the same verification key VKU and ToU
from the user and the server.
2. There exists a polynomial A(x) of degree t such that every honest arbitrator Ari
from the set AR holds a good share (i, shi).
Proof sketch 1. If the first condition is not satisfied then the theorem naturally follows
from the steps taken in the initialization phase. If the server and the user do not agree
on the ToU and the set of arbitrators AR in Steps 1 and 2 of the initialization phase, then
they halt. Steps 6 and 7 of the initialization scheme ensure that any honest arbitrator
receives the same ToU. We prove this by claiming that if the user is honest or the server
is honest, then at least one of them (the honest one) sends the correct ToU to each arbi-
trator. Unless the other party sends the same ToU, the arbitrator sends error messages
to the server and the user after Step 7 and since one of them is honest, the scheme
stops.
We prove the second part of Theorem 1 in the following way. We prove that if an arbi-
trator Ari receives a share (i, shi) that is not a good share, then the arbitrator sends error
messages to the server and the user and the algorithm halts. We assume that the CA is
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honest; hence, the commitment C is a good commitment. Therefore, each honest arbitra-
tor who receives a bad share, and uses C, detects that the share is not a good share and
sends error messages to the server and the user. Since at least one of them is honest, the
algorithm halts.
Theorem 2. Let n be the number of arbitrators and let t be a bound on the number of
malicious arbitrators. Assume the Feldman’s VSS algorithm is secure and that the digi-
tal signatures are unforgeable, then the scheme described in Section “Digital arbitration”
provides user security.
Proof sketch 2. For every setM = {m1, . . . ,mv} of v messages such that f (ToU ,M) =
0. The arbitration phase ensures that each honest arbitrator who receivesM and SigU(M)
where f (ToU ,M) = 0 will not send the share to the server. Since M is signed, the server
can not convince an honest arbitrator that f (ToU ,M) = 1.
Assuming that there are at most t dishonest arbitrators, the server receives at most t
shares of the secret. Since Feldman’s VSS algorithm does not reveal any information on
the secret if the number of the received shares is less than t + 1, the scheme ensures user
security.
Theorem 3. Let n be the number of arbitrators and let t be a bound on the number
of malicious arbitrators. Assume that Feldman’s VSS algorithm is secure, that the digital
signatures used in the scheme are unforgeable, and that n ≥ 2t+1. The scheme described
in Section Digital arbitration provides server security.
Proof sketch 3. LetM = {m1, . . . ,mv} be a set of vmessages such that f (ToU ,M) = 1.
According to Theorem 1, each honest arbitrator i that receives M and SigU(M) where
f (ToU ,M) = 1 sends shi to the server. Furthermore, by the properties of VSS, the server
can discard any incorrect share. Since each share sent from a different honest arbitrator
is a good share, and there are at least t + 1 honest arbitrators, the secret sharing scheme
ensures that the polynomial can be reconstructed, hence the server receives DG.
Conditional anonymity
Conditional anonymity is an interesting application for the arbitration concept. Anony-
mous networks, e.g., Tor [15], allow users to communicate anonymously. Although
anonymity is crucial in some situations (e.g., allows for freedom of speech), it is
problematic in others (e.g., violation of copyright laws). In the proposed conditional
anonymity environment a user communicates anonymously with a server if and only
if the user follows a set of well-defined behavioral norms (or predefined rules). For
example, we want to allow users to post a message anonymously on a bulletin board,
but a user who wants to post information assisting terrorism will not be able to
preserve their anonymity. Note that even though users tend to prefer anonymity
over conditional anonymity, honest users are not deterred by conditional anonymity
requirement.
In order to achieve a conditional anonymity environment, we have to adjust the gen-
eral digital arbitration scheme described in Section “Digital arbitration”. First, an identity
certificate is used in place of the CA. An identity certificate is a CA that identifies users.
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Note that just like the CA in the general scheme, this CA is trusted by all participants.
Second, the identifier of the user IDU is replaced by a pseudonym such that the user
is uniquely identified among all users. Prior to Step 1 of the initialization scheme, the
user has to apply to the CA in order to receive a pseudonym. Third, the digital goods,
DG, is the identity of the user (e.g., social security number). Lastly, the communication
channels are anonymous, which means that the identity of the user is not revealed by
the communication itself. Tor [15] is an example of an anonymous channel. Tor uses
circuits (i.e., tunnels) to provide anonymity. A tunnel is an ordered set of nodes where
each node has auxiliary information identifying its predecessor and successor in the
tunnel.
Security considerations
Since we use anonymous tunnels, the communication itself does not reveal information
about the identity of the user (the DG), hence the server receives information about the
DG only from the arbitrators and iff the user violates the ToU, by Theorems 2 and 3,
conditional anonymity is revoked. Note that our scheme does not provide unlinkability
between messages of the same user. This property is desired since violation of the ToU
may occur as the result of the combination of a few messages. A user who communicates
with two servers can use two different polynomials and then the two communications are
unlinkable.
All security considerations we took into account in the general scheme are still valid for
conditional anonymity.
Additional applications
In this section we briefly describe additional potential applications to the digital arbitra-
tion environment.
• Business transactions - The scheme can be used to guarantee business transactions
environment which is composed of two users who agree on a contract. The contract
contains a Terms of Use agreement, ToU, and a set of arbitrators. Each user may
issue a digital bond to the other user. A bond is a guarantee to pay the other party a
certain amount of money. The bonds remain secret and therefore cannot be cashed
as long as the agreement is not violated.
• Social networks - The scheme can be used to guarantee that members of a social
network live up to the agreed upon expectations and standards of the network and,
under agreed upon conditions, application of sanctions against members who do not
conform.
• Gambling and betting - The general scheme can be modified to allow a trustworthy
betting environment in which the participants cannot cheat and are required to pay
their debts.
• Anonymous betting - A trustworthy betting environment where a user may be
anonymous and participate in a wager. This can be achieved by combining
conditional anonymity and betting environments.
• P2P gambling - A peer to peer gambling environment with no central authority
controlling the system. Today, gambling occupies a large part of Internet
communication, where the gamblers (gambling users) have to trust a centralized
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gambling entity. Using a P2P gambling environment avoids the need for such a trust
and distributes the trust amongst the peers.
• P2P anonymous gambling - A peer to peer gambling environment with no central
authority controlling the system and users are anonymous. This can be achieved by
combining the conditional anonymity and the P2P gambling environments.
• Gaming - A server to user gaming environment (e.g., online chess played against a
software or another user using a central authority) where the users are obligated to
the agreed upon conditions and cannot cheat.
• P2P gaming - A peer to peer gaming environment (e.g., online chess played against
another user or an online multiplayer game where no central authority is involved)
where the users are obligated to the agreed upon conditions and cannot cheat.
• P2P anonymous gaming - A peer to peer gaming environment where the users are
anonymous and obligated to the agreed upon conditions and cannot cheat. This can
be achieved by combining the conditional anonymity and P2P gaming environments.
• Anonymous auction bids - A trustworthy bidding environment where each user keeps
their anonymity and each bid is irreversible such that if a bid wins the user has to pay.
• Blind paper review - A modified environment for reviewing academic papers where
the paper is examined anonymously instead of the current state where papers are
submitted to the editor who chooses a panel to examine the paper with the names of
the authors removed.
Digital arbitration implementation
We implemented a digital arbitration scheme for anonymously posting messages on a
forum. The scheme consists of 4 web services:
1. CA service: validates and signs users’ polynomials and commitments.
2. Server service: allows users to post messages and menages posted messages.
3. Arbitrating service: functions as an interface for the different arbitrators. Allows
users to deposit shares and obtain private keys for signing future messages. Allows
the server to submit messages which violate the forum ToU and post the
corresponding user’s share publicly.
4. Bulletin board service: allows all entities to obtain all public users’ shares.
Furthermore, the implementation consists of a graphical user interface for users which
allows users to communicate with the different servers. The implementation is Java based
and the web services engine is Axis2 version 1.6.0. We deployed the web services in
Apache Tomcat web server version 8.0.24.
Conclusion
In this work we introduced the notion of digital arbitration which enables the resolution
of disputes between servers and users (or between two users) with the aid of arbitrators.
Arbitrators are semi-trusted entities which facilitate communication or business transac-
tions in a social or other network. We demonstrated the usage of arbitrators in the scope
of conditional anonymity, the scope of business transactions, and identified an additional
list of potential applications.
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